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ABSTRACT: This paper explores income 
convergence in European countries. Unlike 
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on the pair-wise approach (Pesaran, 
2007), identifying four cases: long-run 
convergence, catching-up, lagging-behind, 
and divergence. The results suggest that 
catching-up prevails, while no significant 
evidence was found for the existence of 
long-run convergence at the whole sample 
level. Still, three convergence clubs appear 
that consist of countries recording long-run 
convergence, two in transitional countries 
and one involving advanced countries, 
which indicate the similar growth model 
of the countries belonging to each club. 
Nevertheless, the results do not allow us 
to claim with certainty that the income 
paths of the club members will not exhibit 
systematic tendencies toward divergence or 
changes in membership in future.
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PATHS OF INCOME CONVERGENCE BETWEEN 
COUNTRY PAIRS WITHIN EUROPE1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the European Commission, joining the European Union resulted 
in stronger growth performance for new members, which helped them to 
converge with the ‘old’ EU countries (European Commission, 2009). The 
European growth model has been a powerful engine of economic convergence 
over the last five decades (Gill and Raiser, the World Bank, 2012).  
However, countries have been quite heterogeneous regarding their speed and 
pattern of convergence in Europe. Therefore, in previous papers on the subject 
of convergence between European countries the results are mixed, depending 
on the chosen period, sample, and methodology used (see e.g., Matkowski and 
Próchniak, 2007, Reza and Zahra, 2008, Costantini and Lupi, 2005, Cavenaile 
and Dubois, 2011, Ingianni and Žďárek, 2009, Kočenda et al., 2006, Vamvakidis, 
2008, Vojinović and Oplotnik, 2008, Tatomir and Alexe, 2012, Varblane and 
Vahter, 2005, Halmai and Vásáry, 2010, Crafts and Toniolo, 2008, Estrin et al., 
2001, Czasonis and Quinn, 2012). Therefore, since EU members and candidates 
constantly strive for higher income, the path and dynamic of income growth 
relative to other countries is an important question. Also, convergence of per 
capita output is one of the basic motives for a country to join the EU. Therefore, 
income convergence is a significant issue and a recurring theme in the literature.  
This paper addresses the question of heterogeneous convergence and analyses 
the behaviour of output gap (difference in GDP per capita level of two 
countries) for every pair of observed European countries. It investigates 
whether, when, and among which country pairs there is convergence. Special 
attention is paid to the existence of convergence within the group of European 
transition countries, as well as to convergence between these and the developed 
countries. The chosen methodology provides the opportunity to get more 
information about the convergence process for every pair of countries and for 
every sub-period within the observed time period. In addition, attention is paid 
to the analysis of data from the beginning of the economic crisis in order to 
check whether the identified patterns derived from our analysis have been 
retained despite the various responses of countries to the crisis. 
Many EU countries are still going through recession or/and slow recovery from 
the crisis. Some members of the European Union are facing serious difficulties 
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the sustainability of united Europe. Therefore we believe that the convergence of 
European countries is one of the subjects that needs to be examined to point out 
the success achieved so far, and further possibilities for even economic growth 
and reducing the differences between country income levels. It is especially 
important to discover transition countries’ income-growth paths. It can be 
beneficial to relate their growth model and the similarities they share in the 
growth process with that of ‘old’ Europe, and to examine the differences that are 
influencing their journey. In some countries the convergence process has been 
particularly compounded by numerous imbalances (see e.g., Abiad et al., 2009, 
Atoyan, 2010, Berglöf et al., 2009, BRUGEL and wiiw Report, 2010), which has 
been especially evident throughout the global economic crisis. 
The main contribution of the paper to previous research on the subject is 
twofold. First, the comprehensive methodology is based on detailed 
implementation of time-series analysis and Pesaran’s pairwise approach and 
multi-country average measures (Pesaran, 2007) in the pre-crisis period, as well 
as a panel unit root test for both pre-crisis and crisis periods. Previous research 
has not used such an extensive methodological approach. Second, the approach 
has enabled us to examine all country pairs (276 in total) separately, addressing 
the specificities and characteristics of the countries: the economic and non-
economic actualities that have influenced output levels, growth, and paths of 
convergence. This approach also enables us to identify the potential existence of 
convergence clubs. Therefore, this allows us to compare results with 
comprehensive economic analysis, particularly with the growth model that each 
country follows. 
The methodology that we use is based on Carlino and Mills (1993), Bernard and 
Durlauf (1996), Gómez-Zaldívar and Ventosa-Santaulària (2010), and pairwise 
methodology developed by Pesaran (2007). The approach implies the 
observation of the stationarity of output gap time series (expressed as an 
absolute difference between per capita incomes in each pair of countries). We 
observe four cases: 1) long-run convergence, i.e., the stronger definition of 
convergence, when output gap is a mean stationary process; 2) catching-up, i.e., 
the weaker definition of convergence, when output gap is a trend-stationary 
process along negative trend; 3) lagging-behind, when output gap is a trend-
INCOME CONVERGENCE IN EUROPE
125stationary process along positive trend; and 4) divergence, when output gap 
contains a unit-root. For every country pair we observe the exact time interval 
(the initial year and quarter and the final year and quarter) within which there is 
a possibility of recording the aforementioned cases. Additionally, we consider 
the number of multi-country average measures obtained as simple or weighted 
averages of the squared or absolute values of output gap pairs. A panel unit root 
test will be used as a robustness check of findings obtained through the last 
analyses before the crisis, this being also the only possible methodology (because 
of the small number of data) to check whether the findings of convergence 
pattern have changed since the beginning of the crisis. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of previous 
research on convergence in European countries. Description of data and a short 
illustration of methodologies are presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains 
explanations of applied time-series methodology and results from its 
implementation. In section 5 multi-country average measures are presented. 
Section 6 illustrates panel unit root test results. Finally, section 7 presents the 
conclusion. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Matkowski and Próchniak (2005, 2007) analysed real economic convergence of 
income levels between eight new EU entrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
(countries that joined the EU in 2004, minus Cyprus and Malta - CEE-8 
hereafter) and core EU countries (EU-15). They proved that between these 23 
countries, observed individually, there is beta convergence
1. They calculated 
beta coefficients: 1.67% in the period between 1993 and 1998, 2.66% between 
1998 and 2004, and 2.37% for the whole observed period. They also confirmed 
the existence of β-convergence at the regional level (between two regions – 
CEE-8 and EU-15, taken as wholes), with a β-coefficient equal to 2.46% for the 
whole observed period (2.63% in 1993-1998 and 2.32% in 1998-2004). Also, in 
                                                 
1   β-convergence exists when low-income countries grow faster than high-income countries, 
reaching an equilibrium (steady-state) income level. If that level is the same for all countries 
there is unconditional convergence, while conditional β-convergence allows a different steady 
state for countries depending on country-specific conditions (such as savings rate, population 
rate, etc.). The other also very well-known concept of convergence is σ-convergence, i.e., 
when dispersion between income levels decreases over time. 
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convergence between CEE-8 countries for the period between 1993 and 2003, as 
well as between these countries towards the EU-15 income level. Income 
differences between individual countries have a tendency to diminish, 
particularly towards the end of the observed period, while the income gap 
between CEE and EU countries still remains very large, although generally 
decreasing. Ingianni and Žďárek (2009) analysed the process of real convergence 
of new EU member states, paying special attention to CEE-8 countries. The 
analysis was based on beta and sigma-convergence, as well as time-series-based 
stationarity
2 and cointegration tests. They noted that during the last decade 
these economies experienced robust economic growth, which had a stronger 
impact on the convergence process within the CEE-8 group than the 
convergence process of the CEE-8 with the EU-15. 
Reza and Zahra (2008) applied different tests of unit root in panel data for the 
purpose of studying real economic convergence and catching-up in ten 
European Union member states (all those that joined the EU in 2004 – hereafter 
referred to as EU-10) with the average of EU-25 and EU-15 per capita income 
for the period 1995-2005. The obtained results support the existence of absolute 
convergence and catching-up processes, but not of conditional convergence. 
Halmai and Vásáry (2010) analysed the experiences gained in real convergence, 
catch-up processes, and future prospects of new EU member states (EU-10 with 
the average of the EU-25). They concluded that the integration process of the 
new EU member states was successful, that the convergence rate was 
approximately 2.5%, that it would fall by half in the next decade, and that in the 
future these countries could even record divergence. Vojinović and Oplotnik 
(2008) observed unconditional beta and sigma convergence among the EU-10. 
The results obtained through empirical analysis are very similar to the results of 
other analyses on the same subject. They confirm the existence of both types of 
convergence (absolute and conditional) in the second half of the 1990s and the 
2000s. Generally, the poorer new EU member states recorded faster growth than 
the richer new EU member states. As a result, the income gap between these 
countries has decreased (although it remains quite large). The convergence rate 
                                                 
2   They analyse time series that represent the income differences of each CEE-8 country with 
EU-15 average income. 
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2006. 
Varblane and Vahterm (2005) analysed the economic convergence of transition 
countries (new EU entrants in 2004 and 2007: CEE-8 plus Bulgaria and 
Romania, hereafter referred to as CEE-10) during the period 1995-2004. Within 
the analysed period unconditional β-convergence across the transition 
economies was recorded. They also discovered a reduction in the dispersion of 
income levels between accession countries (sigma-convergence). Comparative 
analyses of the economic convergence of new EU member states (CEE-10) with 
the previous entrants (Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal) revealed that the 
CEE-10 had been much more successful in their convergence process before 
joining the EU. Analyses of the macroeconomic, human capital, and 
infrastructure indicators of the current accession of new EU countries in 
comparison to the previous cohesion countries indicated that the new members 
had been much better prepared for the enlargement. Tatomir and Alexe (2012) 
researched and compared CEE-10 with PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, 
Greece, and Spain) in terms of economic convergence with the euro area during 
the last decade (2000-2008, 2000-2010). The paper emphasizes the changes in 
the economic convergence levels due to the recent international crisis. 
Accordingly, they calculated the aggregated index of economic convergence, 
made up of real and structural convergence indices, and highlighted the 
similarities between the states in the two groups regarding economic 
convergence. They showed that in the last decade all countries in the two 
groups, except Italy, made important progress in ‘catching-up’. Slovakia and 
Ireland recorded the fastest economic growth. Cavenaile and Dubois (2011) 
investigated the convergence process of the CEE-10 and 15 Western countries 
between 1990 and 2007. Applying the panel approach to the convergence 
equation, they point out the existence of heterogeneity in the European Union 
and show that the CEE-10 and the old members of the European Union can be 
seen as belonging to significantly different groups in terms of convergence.  
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3. The author 
proved that in recent years those economies have converged rapidly with more 
advanced European economies. However, there are still large external 
imbalances in some parts of the region. This raises questions about 
sustainability and vulnerabilities. Empirical evidence in this paper suggests that 
the convergence trend in emerging Europe is based on strong fundamentals and 
is expected to continue, but at a slower pace. Moreover, the convergence path 
may become volatile as countries with large external imbalances adjust, with 
risks of a hard landing in some cases.  
Costantini and Lupi (2005) used non-stationary panel data approaches in order 
to test convergence in real GDP per capita for 15 European countries (EU-15) 
over the period 1950-2003. They tested for the presence of a unit root in the 
pairwise differences between German real GDP per capita (taken as a 
benchmark) and the real GDP per capita of other EU countries. In this process 
they applied both independent and dependent panel unit root tests and found 
little evidence of stochastic convergence among EU countries for the whole 
period between 1950 and 2003. On the other hand, they identified the presence 
of stochastic convergence in the sub-period between 1950 and 1976.  
3. ILLUSTRATION OF DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In our econometric research we used data on real GDP per capita from the 
EUROSTAT database. The data are quarterly - from the first quarter of 1995 
until the third quarter of 2013 - in euros, logarithmic, and seasonally adjusted
4.  
In our analysis we observe output gaps (the difference between the countries’ 
logarithmic GDP per capita) for every pair of 24 European countries – a total of 
                                                 
3    Albania, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Turkey and Ukraine. 
4   Data were downloaded as non-seasonally adjusted, and then seasonally adjusted using the 
TRAMO/SEATS method. 
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5. In our sample of 24 countries we included Norway along with 
23 selected EU members
6.  
We observed two subsamples:  
1) pre-crisis period (1995Q1-2008Q3) 
2) crisis period (2008Q4-2013Q3)
7 
In the pre-crisis period we implemented comprehensive analysis of the time 
series approach, with the addition of multi-country average measures and panel 
unit root testing.  
In the crisis period we based our conclusion solely on the results from unit root 
tests in panel data. Although we considered time series and average measures 
extremely reliable for testing convergence, we did not have enough data for the 
period from the beginning of the crisis. This is why, with the panel approach, we 
are performing a kind of preliminary examination of output-gap behaviour 
during the crisis. 
4. TIME SERIES APPROACH: METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
4.1 Time series approach: methodology 
In the literature the question of convergence is examined by using a cross-
section, panel, time series, or distribution approach
8. The time series approach 
originated in the 1990s. The idea arose from an equation that was derived from 
the well-known growth-initial level equation related to the concept of β-
                                                 
5   Total number of pairs can be calculated as N(N-1)/2, where N is the number of observed 
countries. 
6   Out of all EU members, our sample does not include the following five countries: Romania, 
Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, and Malta. Romania, Greece, and Ireland are excluded because of 
the problem with data availability. Cyprus and Malta have specific structural characteristics 
and past political experiences, and therefore they have usually been excluded from analysis in 
previous papers on the subject.  
7   For advanced countries the time range is 2008Q4-2013Q2, because of data availability. 
8   For details about these approaches see Islam (2003). 
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9 (i.e. higher initial per capita output level – lower output growth 
rate and vice versa): 
ݕ௧ ൌ ߤ െ ߚ݃ݐ ൅ ሺͳ൅ߚሻݕ௧ିଵ ൅ߝ ௧ (1) 
where ݕ௧ and ݕ௧ିଵ are per capita output values of a country in the current and 
previous periods, respectively; ߚ is the convergence parameter which is negative; 
ߤ represents constant; and ݐ is a deterministic trend. 
When there is no convergence of the country’s income to a steady-state level 
ሺߚൌͲ ሻ, the output will be a non-stationary process. The opposite is true in 
cases when convergence exists ሺߚ൏Ͳ ሻ: i.e., the output will be stationary. Even 
though some previous research studies were based on this equation (e.g., Lee et 
al., 1997), this kind of analysis has two main shortcomings. First, it only enables 
research of convergence within a country, not across (between) countries. When 
a country’s output is a stationary process, it means that the country converges to 
its own steady-state level. Second, the trend in the equation is deterministic (the 
end result pointing to the existence of convergence means that the convergence 
is ‘deterministic’). Therefore, the equation does not lead to the correct 
conclusion if there is a stochastic trend in per capita output (which, according to 
Pesaran, 2007, can be the case because of the stochastic nature of technology 
that influences the output level).  
These can be overcome by observing output gaps (output deviation, expressed 
as an absolute difference between per capita incomes in each pair of countries) 
series and testing the unit-root in those output deviations instead of individual 
output-level data. In this way the time series approach focuses on an across-
country convergence analysis. Also, gap series (because they represent 
deviations) eliminate the influence on the test results of the question of whether 
the technological process is deterministic, stochastic, and/or has a random walk 
component. Therefore, it is possible that there is an across-country convergence 
                                                 
9   “While the cross-section, panel, and (in part) time series approaches have in one way or the 
other investigated β-convergence, the distribution approach focuses on σ-convergence and 
on changes in the cross-section income distribution as a whole.” (Islam, 2003, p. 336) 
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countries is a non-stationary process)
10. 
In literature there are several ways to calculate output deviation: 
a) as the difference between the output of a country (or a region) and the 
average output value of the chosen sample of countries (a sample of regions 
or all the regions of a country), 
b) as the difference between the output of a country (or a region) and output 
value of the chosen reference country (reference region), 
c) as pair-wise output differences, where gaps between all pairs of countries (or 
regions) in the sample are calculated. 
Carlino and Mills (1993) examined US regional data deviations of the log of per 
capita output in relation to the average output level of the U.S. as a whole. The 
results lead to the conclusion that regional conditional convergence in the U.S. 
exists. Evans and Karras (1996) conducted a panel unit root test, which is a 
modified version of the unit root test proposed by Levine and Lin (1993), 
designed specifically for pooled data. They analysed the deviation of output of 
the 48 contiguous U.S. states over the period 1929-1991 and of 54 countries over 
the period 1950-1990 from their average output level, and the results for the set 
of samples also support the conditional convergence hypothesis. The problem of 
obtaining the deviation from the average is that if the output of only one 
economy contains a unit root, the average will be a unit root process. Therefore 
in such cases, when the deviations from the average of each stationary output 
series are calculated, they will contain a unit root.  
Quah (1990) chose the U.S. as a reference country and observed the deviation of 
the output of 114 countries from the U.S. output level. Using a panel unit root 
test, he tested a more rigorous hypothesis: that there is an absolute convergence 
between countries. Although the results dismiss this hypothesis, they are in line 
with the results obtained through other methodologies for testing the 
unconditional convergence in large samples of countries
11. Bernard and Durlauf 
(1996) test output convergence by implementing multivariate cointegration 
                                                 
10   Islam (2003), p. 334. 
11   Referred to Islam (2003), p. 335. 
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output deviations calculated with respect to the U.S. output level. They also 
consider two subsamples of 11 and 6 OECD countries, upon which they 
perform a cointegration analysis, first on all individual output series and then 
on all output deviations from the French output level. The limitations of this 
‘reference country’ methodology are that the author/authors have to choose the 
benchmark country. Even though it is methodologically simpler to consider 
deviation from the output level of one country (benchmark country), the results 
are determined by the choice of benchmark. 
Pesaran’s pair-wise approach differs from the approaches of other authors that 
apply time series for convergence analysis, because it takes into account the 
output gaps for all possible pairs of countries (N(N-1)/2 output gaps across N 
economies). According to Pesaran, two countries are convergent (non-
divergent) if their output gap is a mean-stationary process. In all other cases, 
when the gap contains a deterministic or stochastic trend, countries exhibit 
non-convergence (divergence). When he identifies mean-stationary output gap 
series, he calculates the percentage (fraction) as the number of those series in 
total gaps, compares this proportion with the significance level of the unit-root 
test, and draws a conclusion about the existence of long-run convergence. 
Pesaran proves that in the case of non-convergence in a sample of countries and 
under the null of non-convergence (or divergence, e.g., if the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller unit-root test is applied), one could expect the fraction of output 
gap pairs for which the unit-root hypothesis is rejected to be close to the 
significance level of the unit-root test applied to the individual output gap pairs 
 (because the fraction of the rejections converges to alpha as N and T → ) and 
under the null of convergence (e.g., in the case of the Kiatowski-Philips-Smith-
Shin unit-root test) the number of the fraction converges to 100% as N and T → 
. The advantage of Pesaran’s pairwise approach in comparison to a 
multivariate cointegration approach is that the latter can only be applied to a 
limited number of countries. The advantage in relation to the cross-section and 
panel approaches is that “it relates more naturally to the club convergence 
literature”, i.e., “the convergence results from the analysis of pairwise output 
gaps can be used to form convergence clubs” (Pesaran, 2007, p. 314). 
INCOME CONVERGENCE IN EUROPE
133We based our analysis on Pesaran’s pairwise approach, but, unlike Pesaran, our 
analysis goes further. We not only concentrate on long-run convergence (only 
mean stationary output gaps) or the corresponding percentage, but also, based 
on the broad literature that applies time series methodology (see Bernard and 
Durlauf, 1996, Gómez and Ventosa-Santaulària, 2010 and 2012), we observed 
and divided non-convergent (divergent, as defined by Pesaran) output gap 
behaviour into three different processes: catching-up, lagging-behind, and 
divergence (see cases 2-4 below).  
In our analysis we first calculated output gaps as the difference between log per 
capita output level for every pair of countries (total pairs N(N-1)/2): 
���� �� �� �� �� (2) 
For output gap series, we test the unit root by using the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test with 
two bandwidth selection methods: automatic and with a bandwidth parameter 
equal to three
12. The order of the ADF regressions ��� is chosen using model-
selection criteria, primarily the Akaike information criterion (AIC)
13. 
We classified all test results into four different cases: 
1. Long run convergence (con). We start with the Pesaran pairwise approach and 
test for existence of output gap stationarity around the mean value
14:  
lim��� �������� �� ����������� �� (3) 
                                                 
12   As suggested by Pesaran, the lag window should be computed using the formula: �������� 
13   There are a certain number of gaps where Schwarz information criterion (SIC) is applied for 
determining the number of lags. This is done in cases where we find it much more 
appropriate than applying AIC. That is noted in our results, which are available upon request.  
14   In many research studies preceding Pesaran (2007) (e.g., Bernard, 1991 and Bernard and 
Durlauf, 1995), the authors tested long-run convergence using the following equation: 
lim
���
�������� �� �����������  
This definition implies that output gap is stationary around null. In contrast to that 
definition, Pesaran’s definition is relaxed, in the sense that convergence countries do not 
need to be identical in all aspects. 
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(savings rate, population growth, initial endowment, etc.). In this case, there 
are no more reductions or increases of the output gap and the difference in 
income for these countries remains stable over time. This definition implies 
deterministic convergence and represents the stronger definition of 
convergence. 
2. Catching-up (cu). Unlike Pesaran’s, our analysis does not concentrate only on 
the long-run convergence. Based on the broad literature on convergence that 
applies time series methodology (see Bernard and Durlauf 1996, Gómez and 
Ventosa-Santaulària 2010, 2012), we also take into account the stochastic 
(‘weaker’) version of convergence when the output differences narrow 
between dates ݐ  and ݐ൅ܶ : 
ܧ൫ݕ௜ǡ௧ା் െݕ ௝ǡ௧ା்หܫ௧൯൏ݕ ௜ǡ௧ െݕ ௝ǡ௧, where ݕ௜ǡ௧ ൐ݕ ௝ǡ௧ (4) 
This definition represents ‘convergence as catching-up’ and appears when 
the output gap is stationary around a negative trend.  
3. Lagging-behind (lb). When output gaps are stationary around a positive 
deterministic trend they are classified as a lagging-behind case. Lagging-
behind means that output difference increases over time between countries.  
ܧ൫ݕ௜ǡ௧ା் െݕ ௝ǡ௧ା்หܫ௧൯൐ݕ ௜ǡ௧ െݕ ௝ǡ௧, where ݕ௜ǡ௧ ൐ݕ ௝ǡ௧ (5) 
4. Divergence (div). Divergence, as we define it in our analysis, occurs when the 
gap series have a unit-root. In this case the difference in per capita output 
cannot be predicted. 
We test for the presence of the unit root in all output gaps (276 in total). We test 
every output gap series using the three unit-root test statistics discussed above, 
namely ADF(p), KPSS (automatic bandwidth), and KPSS (bandwidth set to 
three)
15. For every specific pair we observe in detail all possible time ranges and 
                                                 
15   The results of the two different KPSS tests we applied were used for the robustness check. 
They almost invariably supported the decision we made based on graph, correlogram, and 
ADF test analysis.  
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quarter) within which some of the four abovementioned cases and their 
combinations are recorded (cu cu, cu lb, lb lb, lb cu, con cu, cu con, con lb, lb con, 
con con).  
4.2 Time series approach: results 
Our empirical results, using stationarity analysis of all 276 series that represent 
pair-wise output gaps, suggest four main conclusions regarding EU countries’ 
income-gap behaviour previous to the crisis
16: 
1. Catching-up dominated in Europe. As many as 70% of pairs in the sample 
recorded catching-up during at least a certain period within the observed 
time interval. However, 60% of country pairs recorded catching-up during 
the entire observed period. 
2. On the whole sample level, we can conclude that there is no significant 
evidence of long-run convergence (as defined in Pesaran, 2007); 
3. However, three convergence clubs have formed in our sample, according to 
the level of long-run convergence. Two convergence clubs are within 
transition countries: Baltic and Visegrad+3. The third club consists of a 
certain number of pairs within developed EU economies and we named it 
Advanced club; 
4. Baltic is catching-up with Visegrad+3 and Advanced, and Visegrad+3 is 
catching up with Advanced. This conclusion is the consequence of the first 
result, i.e., countries with lower per capita output levels have been catching-
up with the economies with higher per capita output levels in general in 
Europe during the observed period. 
The first result is that cu has appeared in the majority of cases. Catching-up 
means a reduction in the differences in output. This corroborates the results of 
previous research mentioned in the literature on convergence in Europe. 
Therefore, our methodology clearly confirms the fact that β-convergence 
characterizes Europe in the pre-crisis period: countries with a lower initial level 
                                                 
16   Because of space constraints we did not include detailed results in the paper, but they are 
available upon request. 
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growth rate in the observed period (1995-2008) and vice versa (Graph 1).  
The percentage of country pairs that indicate catching-up, lagging-behind, 
convergence, or divergence in any period is 69.6%, 22.8%, 15.2%, and 4.3%, 
respectively (Table 1). The fact that either lagging-behind or divergence during 
at least a certain time interval within the observed period was identified in only 
27% of pairs indicates that convergence significantly dominated in Europe, 
regardless of whether it was defined as strong or weak. 
Graph 1. Initial level of real per capita GDP and average annual growth rate 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on EUROSTAT data  
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137Table 1.  Share of country pairs that show convergence, catching-up, lagging-
behind, or divergence in any period within the observed time interval 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note:  
1.  cu ˗ catching-up, lb ˗ lagging-behind, con ˗ long-run convergence, div ˗ divergence 
2.  The sum of percentages is higher than 100% because Table 1 is derived from Table 2. 
Therefore, some output gaps are included in two groups if they show different behaviour in 
different time-intervals (as can be seen in Table 2). 
If we observe more detailed results (Table 2), catching-up (cu) occurs in 59.1% 
of pairs, lagging-behind (lb) in 12.7% of pairs, and long-run convergence (con) 
in 9.1% of pairs. The decrease of difference in per capita income, which is 
followed by a period of increase in difference (cu lb), was recorded in 5.8% of 
pairs, whereas 4.3% of pairs recorded divergence. Each of the combinations (lb 
cu), (con cu), (con lb), (con con), and (cu con) appeared in 1.4% of total pairs. 
The case of increase in the difference in two consecutive periods, brought to an 
end by a break in series (lb lb), appears in 1.1% of pairs. Finally, only one pair 
has recorded (cu cu), and the same applies to (lb con). 
Table 2. Number of country pairs that indicate convergence, catching-up, 
lagging-behind, divergence, or their combinations, and the share in 
total number of pairs 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: cu ˗ catching-up, lb ˗ lagging-behind, con ˗ long-run convergence, div ˗ divergence 
The second result follows Pesaran criteria. Non-convergence exists when the 
fraction of rejection under the null of unit root (the number of series that are 
stationary around a constant out of the total number of observed series) is close 
to 5% (Pesaran, 2007). Our results suggest that the ratio of pairs that have 
recorded long-run convergence during at least a certain period (within the 
observed time interval) and the total number of observed pairs is very low at 
cu lb con div
Share in total number of pairs  69.6% 22.8% 15.2% 4.3%
cu lb con
cu
lb
div
lb
cu
con
cu
con
lb
con
con
cu
con
lb
lb
cu
cu
lb
con
Number of country pairs 1 6 3 3 5 2 5 1 6 1 244444311
Share in total number of pairs  59.1% 12.7% 9.1% 5.8% 4.3% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.1% 0.4% 0.4%
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sample level there is no significant evidence of long-run convergence.  
This result is in line with the process of transition from centrally planned to 
market economies, the differences in the pace at which these changes were 
applied, individual country characteristics, significant differences between the 
development level of these transition countries and the advanced part of Europe 
(which is still large, despite the convergence that took place), etc. 
The third result is that two convergence clubs can be distinguished within the 
group of transition countries: Baltic (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and 
Visegrad+3 (Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary along with Croatia, 
Bulgaria, and Slovenia). The third club we called the Advanced countries 
convergence club (see tables 3 and 4).  
In the Baltic group the fraction rate is 67%, whereas in Visegrad+3 it is 43% 
(53% excluding Bulgaria) and in Advanced it is 30%. Although the values of 
these parameters are still not of a level to suggest that shocks to the output gap 
in these groups of countries will not have a permanent effect, they are still high, 
especially taking into account the following circumstances: 
-  First, these countries are characterized by certain country-specific factors 
(e.g., regime, institutional changes). These factors can have a highly 
persistent influence on output gap, which at the same time does not have to 
be permanent – i.e., the series is not a random walk but contains a stochastic 
trend.  
-  Furthermore, the sample is relatively short since it contains only 55 
observations, which makes the unit root tests somewhat limited in their 
ability to identify long-term stationarity around a constant. 
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indicate long-run convergence 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note:  
1.  @all stands for countries that exhibited long-run convergence during the entire observed time 
interval (1995 Q1 to 2008 Q3). In other cases the time interval when countries exhibited long-
run convergence (within the observed time interval) is specified, e.g., 1996 Q3 – 2008 Q3 in 
the cases of the Czech Republic and Poland, which means that they recorded long-run 
convergence between the third quarter of 1996 and the third quarter of 2008.  
2.  Countries that make up the first convergence club are marked in dark grey (Baltic group: 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and countries that represent the second convergence club in 
light gray (Visegrad group: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary + 3: Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, and Croatia). 
Table 4. Results of the analysis: Pairs of advanced European countries that 
indicate long-run convergence 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: @all stands for countries that exhibited long-run convergence during the entire observed 
time interval (1995 Q1 to 2008 Q3). In other cases the time interval when countries exhibited 
long-run convergence (within the observed time interval) is specified, e.g., 1995 Q1 – 2007 Q4 in 
the cases of Denmark and Germany means that they recorded long-run convergence between the 
first quarter of 1995 and the fourth quarter of 2007.  
Baltic countries
Pair Lat_Lit
Period 1996q2 2000q2 2000q3 2008q3 @all
Visegrad+3 countries
Pair Sloven_Pol Cze_Pol Slovak_Pol
Period @all 1996q3 2008q3 @all
Pair Sloven_Cze Hun_Pol Slovak_Bul
Period 1996q4 2008q3 2001q1 2007q1 1998q2 2008q3
Pair Sloven_Cro Hun_Cro Slovak_Cro
Period 2000q1 2008q3 2000q1 2007q4 2000q1 2006q3
Est_Lit
Countries Lux_Swe Swe_Pol Nor_Bel Den_UK Fin_UK Net_Fra Ita_Por
Period 2000q1 2008q3 1996q4 2002q4 @all 2003q1 2008q3 1996q4 2003q4 1996q3 2005q1 1998q1 2008q3
Countries Lux_Fin Nor_Den Nor_Fra Den_Ger Fin_Spa Net_Bel Ger_Ita
Period 1998q1 2008q3 @all @all 1995q1 2007q4 1996q3 2001q2 1995Q1 2007Q2 1995q1 2006q4
Countries Swe_Fin Nor_Net Nor_Spa Den_Fra Fin_Pol Net_Aus Fra_Por
Period 1997q1 2007q2 @all 1997q4 2008q3 @all 1995q1 2003q1 @all 1996q1 2008q3
Countries Swe_Por Nor_Aus Den_Net Den_Spa Aus_Bel UK_Pol Spa_Pol
Period 1995q1 2002q1 1995q2 2007q4 2002q2 2007q1 2002q4 2008q3 1995q1 2008q2 1996 2002 1995q1 2003q1
Countries Bel_UK UK_Bel
Period 1997q1 2001q4 2003q1 2007q2 1997q1 2003q1 2003q2 2008q3 1995q1 2001q1 2001q3 2008q3
UK_Spa Net_UK
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each country’s income path. The Baltic states had the highest growth rates in 
Europe from 2000 until the beginning of the global crisis. According to our 
results, they were, without exception, catching-up with all individual countries 
with higher output levels, i.e., countries that belong to the Visegrad +3 and 
Advanced groups.  
At the start of the observed period, Baltic countries experienced hitches in their 
economic growth: 
-  Estonia had experienced slower growth in 1999. This was a consequence of 
previous problems on the stock market, the banking crisis, and the crisis in 
the CIS
17. Estonia had the best results among CEE countries when it comes to 
catching-up, because in the observed period it caught up with and even 
overtook Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, and Poland. 
-  The Latvian economy stabilized towards the end of 1994, with the help of a 
recovery in light industry and a sudden growth boom in commerce and 
finance. This recovery was disrupted twice, first in 1995 by a banking crisis 
and the bankruptcy of Banka Baltija, the largest Latvian bank, and then in 
1998 by a serious financial crisis in Russia.  
-  By 1998 the Lithuanian economy had also survived early years of uncertainty 
and a few setbacks.  
Still, in the pre-crisis period the growth of Baltic states was based on unsound 
foundations. Just before the crisis started they experienced large imbalances: a 
very high current account (CA) deficit and increasing indebtedness, an 
extremely high share of bank-related capital inflows in GDP (capital 
investments which can be withdrawn faster than other types of investment) and 
a very large share of foreign currency loans. The rapid growth was stimulated by 
the growth of domestic demand, followed by the growth of CA deficit. In 2007 
CA deficit in GDP grew as high as 14.4% in Lithuania, 15.9% in Estonia, and 
22.4% in Latvia
18. CA deficits were mainly financed by foreign banks.  
                                                 
17   Commonwealth of Independent States. 
18   Source: Eurostat. 
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based on purchasing-power parity in these countries decreased by 13% in 
Estonia and 17% in Latvia and Lithuania between 2008 and 2009). Latvia was 
the hardest hit of all European Union member states.  
The Visegrad+3 group, on the other hand, had much smaller external 
imbalances, but its economic growth was relatively modest in comparison to the 
Baltic states
19. Even with the slower growth, Visegrad  countries recorded 
convergence with countries with a higher level of output belonging to the 
Advanced group.  
Bulgaria is an exception because, according to our results, it had been constantly 
lagging behind Baltic countries, although it has lower income: the output 
differences between Bulgaria and the Baltic countries had been increasing.  
Slovenia is also specific because it has often shown irregularity/unpredictability 
of its output trends, i.e., divergence with other countries.  
At the beginning of the period Poland recorded similar growth to the developed 
countries, but later its output began to display trends similar to the other CEE 
countries. Most likely the reasons for slower growth - which put Poland in a 
growth path similar to advanced countries at the beginning of our observed 
period - were the country’s transformation reforms to a market-oriented 
economy during 1992-1997.  
A sudden increase in output gap occurred between Hungary and the majority of 
other countries at the beginning and the end of the period. By 1995 Hungary 
had many economic problems, including the highest foreign debt in Europe, a 
large trade deficit, rising inflation, etc. A stabilization plan was applied in 1995, 
which resulted in slower economic growth for the next several years. The reason 
for the slowdown at the end of the observed period was the implementation of 
an austerity programme, which derailed the growth of the Hungarian economy 
in 2007.  
                                                 
19   With the exception of Bulgaria, which recorded the highest CA deficit in the EU of as much 
as 25% of GDP in 2007. 
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2008) also slowed down Slovakian growth at the beginning of the observed 
period. 
In the group of Advanced countries, several regularities can be singled out:  
-  Italy, France, and Germany mostly lagged behind more developed countries. 
Italy and Germany converged until 2006. After 2005 Italy experienced a huge 
drop in output level compared to Germany and the output gap between Italy 
and Germany suddenly widened at the end of the period.  
-  After a successful beginning, Portugal started to lag behind advanced 
countries in output after 2000. Because of the very poor results of the 
Portuguese economy in the 2000s, some economists called this country in 
2007 “the new sick man of Europe”
20.  
-  The difference between the per capita outputs of advanced economies grew 
in relation to the output of Luxembourg and Sweden (i.e. many countries 
lagged behind these two developed countries). The lagging of other advanced 
countries behind Luxembourg can be explained by the fact that it achieved 
enormous financial integration during the observed period (see Abiad et al., 
2009). 
5. AVERAGE MEASURES: METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
5.1 Average measures: methodology 
According to Pesaran (2007), it is possible to derive the series of ‘average’ 
deviations at the level of groups of countries and use them as a basis for testing 
the existence of long-run convergence within a group. Instead of observing a 
large number of output-gap series the idea is to calculate the average value of 
gaps and test the stationarity of thus-obtained series. We obtained the average 
value series as the unweighted or population-weighted average of squared or 
absolute output gaps. In the case of long-run convergence, i.e., when output 
gaps are stationary around the constant mean, the multi-country average 
measure of dispersions will also be stationary around a constant mean. 
                                                 
20   http://www.economist.com/node/9009032 
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two of them are unweighted measures: 
1. Simple average with squared output gaps (D unweighted: D_uw) 
��
� �
�
������∑∑ ���� �� ���
� �
�����
���
���  (6) 
2. Simple average of the absolute output gaps (delta unweighted: delta_uw) 
∆��
�
������∑∑ ���� �� ��� �
�����
���
���  (7) 
The third and fourth measures are weighted averages, where the weights are 
population size: 
3. Weighted average with squared output gaps (D weighted: D_w) 
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�� �
∑∑ ���������������
� �
�����
���
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∑∑ ������
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�����
���
���
 (8) 
4. Weighted average of the absolute output gaps (delta weighted: delta_w) 
∆�
���
∑∑ ��������������� �
�����
���
���
∑∑ ������
�
�����
���
���
 (9) 
Unweighted average measures also have important theoretical meaning:  
��
� is equivalent to 2s�
�. Therefore �� is proportional to the standard deviation 
within the group (root of the squared deviation of ��� from the average for the 
group, for each i), which is used in literature as a measure of the existence of σ-
convergence. If the series of output gaps in the observed group of countries 
records long-run convergence, ����
�� is fixed and therefore invariant. On the 
other hand, ����
�� will have a deterministic or stochastic trend if one or more 
series of output gaps in the observed group is trend-stationary or contains a unit 
root. 
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21. ��∆�� does not vary 
in time in the case of existence of long-run pair-wise convergence of output 
gaps. On the other hand, even in the case of long-run convergence, the Gini 
coefficient can have a trend if �� � has a deterministic and/or stochastic trend. 
Therefore, despite the wide usage of the Gini coefficient in economic literature, 
∆� is a better measure when testing the existence of cross-country output 
convergence. 
These two average measures can lead to the wrong conclusion in cases where 
there is a big difference in population between observed countries. Therefore we 
try to get the weighted average of the squared or absolute values of output 
deviation from the population, and we obtain ��
∗�	 and ∆�
∗. Stationarity around 
the constant or the existence of trend in the thus-obtained series will manifest 
themselves in the same manner as in the case of their counterparts (��
�	and ∆�), 
depending on the characteristics of output gaps (depending whether all the 
series are stationary or one or more of them contain a deterministic or 
stochastic trend). Still, the characteristics of these two measures will also be 
determined by the differences in the population growth between the countries. 
First we calculated the measures at the level of the sample, that is, for all 
observed European countries
22 noted as eu_D_unweighted, 
europe_D_weighted, eu_delta_unweighted, and eu_delta weighted, for ��
�, ��
∗�, 
∆� and ∆�
*, respectively in Table 5. We also performed the same calculations at 
the level of the group of developed countries (advanced_D_unweighted, 
advanced_D_weighted, advanced_delta_unweighted, and 
advanced_delta_weighted). When it comes to countries in transition, we also 
observed average measures at the level of convergence clubs which emerged in 
the results of previous analysis: Baltic and Visegrad (baltic_D_unweighted, 
baltic_D_weighted, baltic_delta_unweighted, baltic_delta_weighted, and 
visegrad_D_unweighted, visegrad_D_weighted, visegrad_delta_unweighted, 
visegrad_delta_weighted). Because of a pronounced volatility of Bulgarian GDP 
                                                 
21   Still, weighted income values are not used in the calculation of the Gini coefficient, as is the 
case with the calculation of ∆�. 
22   All the average measures are calculated without Croatia, since the data for that country are 
only available for the period after 2000 and so could not be included in the calculations. 
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within the group of countries in transition after excluding Bulgaria. 
5.2 Average measures: results 
The results point to the following conclusions, which are generally in line with 
the expectations and the findings of the previous pair-wise analysis: 
  There is catching-up at the level of the sample (see EU in Table 5). Catching-
up is recorded within this larger group, since there is a significant number of 
individual output gaps with a deterministic or a stochastic trend. In addition, 
three out of four measures suggest that catching-up began at the end of the 
1990s. 
  Long-run convergence, according to average measures, occurs in two out of 
three convergence clubs: in the Advanced club (two out of four measures 
point to long-run convergence at the beginning of the period) and the 
Visegrad club (excluding Bulgaria and Croatia, see note below Table 5). 
  The group of Baltic countries record catching-up, which we explain by the 
lack of long-run convergence between Estonia and Latvia.  
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Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: 
1.  @all stands for clubs that recorded long-run convergence, catching-up, or lagging-behind 
during the entire observed time interval (1995 Q1 to 2008 Q3). In other cases the time interval 
when clubs exhibited specified behaviours (within the observed time interval) is particularly 
highlighted, e.g., 1996 Q1 2008 Q3 in EU cases means that entire sample countries recorded 
catching-up from the first quarter of 1996 to the third quarter of 2008.  
2.  Because data for Croatia are available from 2000 Q1 to 2008 Q3, we had to exclude it from 
average measure calculations.  
3.  Because Bulgaria shows high volatility of per capita GDP, we calculated average measures for 
the Visegrad club after we had excluded it.  
4.  The table contains results of the ADF unit root test. The KPSS test confirms the findings 
shown here. The KPSS test points to trend-stationarity during a somewhat longer time interval 
(from 1995/96 until 2008) for EU countries, and mean-stationarity during the entire time 
interval (@all) in the case of visegrad_delta_unweighted. 
Convergence club Mean stationary Note
eu_D_uweighted 1996q1 2008q3 cu w/o Cro
eu_D_weighted 2000q2 2008q3 cu w/o Cro
eu_delta_unweighted 1998q1 2008q3 cu w/o Cro
eu_delta_weighted 1999q3 2008q3 cu w/o Cro
advanced_D_unweighted 1995q1 2001q4 2002q1 2008q3 lb
1995q1 2001q4 cu
2002q1 2008q3 lb
advanced_delta_unweighted 1995q1 2002q1 2002q2 2008q3 lb
1995q1 2001q4 cu
2003q1 2008q3 lb
baltic_D_unweighted @all cu
baltic_D_weighted @all cu
baltic_delta_unweighted @all cu
baltic_delta_weighted @all cu
visegrad_D_unweighted 1995q1 2005q1 w/o Cro and Bul
visegrad_D_weighted @all w/o Cro and Bul
visegrad_delta_unweighted 1997q1 2007q1 w/o Cro and Bul
visegrad_delta_weighted @all w/o Cro and Bul
Trend stationary
advanced_D_weighted
advanced_delta_weighted
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6.1 Panel unit root tests: methodology 
Further empirical analysis of convergence is based on the implementation of the 
panel data and use of unit root tests. There are two reasons for this additional 
methodology: 
1. For the pre-crisis period, only as another validation of the division of 
countries into three different convergence clubs, derived from the previous 
more extensive, more precise, and more detailed pair-wise analysis and 
multi-country average measures. 
2. From the beginning of the global crisis, as a way to test how countries from 
the three clubs behaved during the crisis period. Since, from the beginning of 
the crisis, the time series of countries’ income (and therefore of output gaps) 
are short, the panel is at present the only way to carry out this examination. 
In panel unit root testing we use several different tests: Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC), 
Harris-Tzavalis (HT), Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS), Fisher-type unit-root based on 
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests including drift term (Fisher), and Maddala and 
Wu (MW). 
All of the tests are based on the null hypothesis, claiming that the observed 
variable (output gap between income levels of countries within groups) has a 
unit root. If the null hypothesis is rejected, this result leads to a conclusion 
consistent with our findings from the pre-crisis period: i.e., that, within every 
group, there are pairs of countries that have long-run convergence (that are 
stationary around the mean value). 
Although we consider the previous two analyses - Pair-wise and Multi-country 
average measures - to be more reliable for testing for convergence, we do not 
have enough data for the crisis period to use them: which is why, with the panel 
approach, we are performing a first illustration of output gap behaviour during 
the crisis in three separate groups. This analysis is done with the sole purpose of 
overcoming the lack of data and achieving some sort of preliminary proof of the 
behaviour of these groups in the crisis period. 
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Table 6 contains the results of the panel unit root tests applied on the data of 
series of country pairs grouped in three clubs, isolated in the previous analysis. 
The table presents the results of the tests, as an answer to our hypothesis about 
the existence of long-run convergence within groups. The results are given only 
for tests that involve a constant as the only deterministic component. The Yes 
answer means that the null hypothesis is rejected at the five percent significance 
level, and that tests clearly suggest the absence of stochastic and deterministic 
trends in the output gap.  
Table 6. Panel unit root test results 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note:  
1.  For the pre-crisis period in the Advanced, Baltic, and Visegrad groups we included only gaps 
that we had already verified to be I(0) in previous pair-wise analysis. Here we excluded Poland 
from the advanced group and Croatia and Bulgaria from the Visegrad group.  
2.  PIS-Portugal, Italy, and Spain.  
3.  Level of significance is 5%. For * 15%.  
4.  LLC is Levin-Lin-Chu test, HT is Harris-Tzavalis test, IPS is Im-Pesaran-Shin test, Fisher is 
Fisher-type unit-root test based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests included drift term, and 
MW is Maddala and Wu test. 
Most of the results based on the panel unit root tests suggest rejection of the null 
hypothesis for output gaps, which leads to the conclusion that the series of 
output gaps do not contain stochastic and deterministic trends: i.e., there is 
long-run convergence between countries within the groups. Regarding the 
model with individual constants, the Levin, Lin, and Chu test shows the non-
stationary output gaps within the advanced group in the pre-crisis period. 
However, this test implies homogeneity of the autoregressive coefficient in all of 
the entities (in the case of convergence, this means an equal speed of 
Advanced Baltic Visegrad
1995Q1 2008Q3 2008Q4 2013Q2 1995Q1 2008Q3 2008Q4 2013Q3 1995Q1 2008Q3 2008Q4 2013Q3
All advanced All advanced Advanced w/o PIS PIS
LLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* Yes    Yes
* Yes
HT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fisher Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MW Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
* Yes No
        Period  
Test
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than those which are not limited in the same way. 
The tests that have been done confirm previous findings about output-gaps 
mean-stationarity within the examined groups in the pre-crisis period.  
In addition, the results have tentatively confirmed the stationarity for the 
second sub-period regarding the country groups. Furthermore, the data show 
that the countries in the advanced group can be divided into a PIS-countries 
group – Portugal, Italy, and Spain – and other advanced countries that have had 
similar income behaviour during the crisis.  
7. CONCLUSION 
In our paper we performed a detailed analysis of 276 time series that represent 
output gaps (absolute difference between per capita incomes between pairs of 
countries) in Europe. We used a pair-wise approach in the pre-crisis period, 
along with multi-country average measures and panel method, as well as panel 
method for the crisis period. 
According to our results, catching-up dominated in Europe before the crisis. 
This means that the difference in per capita output between European countries 
mostly narrowed in the observed time period. On the other hand, during the 
same period long-run convergence was not significant at the sample level. Still, 
it is considerably present in the group of transition countries, which are divided 
into two groups, Baltic and Visegrad+3. A certain number of pairs in the group 
of advanced economies also recorded long-run convergence. The results of 
average dispersion measures and panel unit root tests confirm the results of the 
previous pair-wise analysis. Our results indicate that countries within each club 
had certain similarities when it came to the initial level of development and 
applied growth models in the pre-crisis period. In addition, it is particularly 
noticeable that when countries were divided into Baltic and Visegrad +3 groups 
they were catching up with one another as well as with the Advanced group of 
countries.  
From the beginning of the global crisis, panel unit root test results suggested the 
existence of the Visegrad,  Baltic, and Advanced convergence clubs: i.e., the 
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regarding income behaviour. Furthermore, according to our results the 
Advanced club can be split into two subgroups: PIS (Portugal, Italy, and Greece) 
and others. 
Therefore, our analysis confirms that ‘new’ EU member states recorded an 
indisputable catching-up with the developed part of Europe, which started 
considerably before they joined the EU. The pre-accession harmonization 
process with the implementation of major economic reforms primarily lead to 
the fast integration and the quick growth towards developed Europe.  
Our findings also indicate that there are two different growth models within 
transition countries and one model for developed European countries. 
Developing EU countries’ rapid financial integration resulted in a sudden influx 
of capital, creating large imbalances. This was particularly significant in the 
Baltic states, which recorded the largest CA deficits in the pre-crisis period. On 
the other hand, Visegrad had a relatively balanced and modest growth before the 
crisis, but much smaller declines in income than Baltic states during the crisis. 
Therefore, despite the positive results that financial liberalization and 
integration have had on income convergence, a huge drop in GDP and slow 
recovery in Baltic countries after the beginning of the crisis have proved that 
this model was unsustainable in the long run. This has stressed the need for 
Europe to base its future economic growth and income convergence on sound 
economic foundations. This implies a model of growth which would, above all, 
guarantee macroeconomic stability. 
Overall, our results point to the conclusion that, although there are signs of the 
existence of long-run convergence within the three convergence clubs with 
similar European growth models, the obtained percentage is still not on a level 
which would enable us to claim that the income paths of countries that are 
members of a certain club will not exhibit systematic tendencies towards 
membership changes and divergence in the future. 
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APPENDIX
Table A1. List of countries
Country Abbreviation
Austria Aus
Belgium Bel
Bulgaria Bul
Croatia Cro
Czech Republic Cze
Denmark Den
Estonia Est
Finland Fin
France Fra
Germany Ger
Hungary Hun
Italy Ita
Latvia Lat
Lithuania Lit
Luxembourg Lux
Netherlands Net
Norway Nor
Poland Pol
Portugal Por
Slovenia Sloven
Slovakia Slovak
Spain Spa
Sweden Swe
United Kingdom UK
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